Thi s paper present s a revi ew of t he recent econom i cs l i t erat ure i n t he area of i l l i ci t drug use. Part i cul ar at t ent i on i s pai d t o t he econom i cs of addi ct i on and t he rat i onal addi ct i on m odel , t he w el fare econom i cs fram ew ork for anal ysi ng t he soci al cost s of drug use, and t he at t em pt s t hat have been m ade by econom i st s t o eval uat e recent or proposed pol i cy i nt ervent i ons. A dom i nant t hem e i n t hi s revi ew i s t he probl em of poor dat a avai l abi l i t y. Thi s i s part i cul arl y t rue w hen i t com es t o i m pl em ent i ng t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel , but i t i s al so apparent i n t he l i t erat ure on est i m at i ng t he cost s of i l l i ci t drug use t o soci et y as a w hol e. O ne of t he m ai n concl usi ons of t hi s revi ew i s t hat unt i l recent l y publ i c pol i cy has not been part i cul arl y i nfl uenced by research carri ed out by econom i st s. It i s not cl ear w het her t hi s i s because econom i st s have had t o grappl e w i t h i nadequat e dat a, and hence t hei r concl usi ons are couched i n uncert ai nt y, or w het her i t i s because drugs researchers have assum ed a very l i m i t ed rol e for econom i st s i n t hei r anal ysi s. * Publ i c Sect or Econom i cs Research Cent re, D epart m ent of Econom i cs, U ni versit y of Lei cester. I am grateful t o St eve Pudney for hel pful com m ent s and suggest i ons on an earl i er draft . Rem ai ni ng errors and om i ssions are t he sole responsibil i t y of t he author.
Introduction
The purpose of t hi s paper i s t o provi de an overvi ew of t he l i t erat ure t hat has consi dered i l l i ci t drug use from an econom i cs perspect i ve. The i m port ance of t hi s t ype of revi ew cannot be overem phasi sed. In a recent edi t ori al of t he j ournal D rug and Al cohol Revi ew, John Bri dges of t he N at i onal Bureau of Econom i c Research expressed seri ous concern over t he rel uct ance of drug researchers and pol i cy m akers t o i ncorporat e econom i cs i nt o drug research. H e concl uded t hat : … Unl ess il l i ci t drug researchers and pol i cy m akers all ow advances in t he understandi ng of t he econom i cs of i l l i cit drugs t o bet t er i nform research and pol i cy, prospect s for devel opi ng m ore effecti ve responses are dism al. (Bri dges, 1999, p. 252 ).
Q ui t e w hy t hi s concern shoul d ari se w i l l becom e apparent as we proceed, al t hough i t i s w ort h not i ng t hat i n t he U S, i t has been argued t hat drugs pol i cy i s form ul at ed w i t h very l i t t l e regard t o any research, i rrespect i ve of di sci pl i ne (Reut er, 2001) .
Il l i ci t drug use, by defi ni t i on, i s a covert act i vi t y and as such i s not w el l underst ood, al t hough i t s consequences are easi l y observed and at t ract consi derabl e m edi a and governm ent at t ent i on. Indeed, recent governm ent s have pl aced a hi gh pri ori t y on addressi ng drugs i ssues, w i t h t he current adm i ni st rat i on appoi nt i ng a seni or ci vi l servant (t he so-cal l ed 'D rugs Tsar') t o oversee t he i m pl em ent at i on of a t en-year pl an t o t ackl e drug m i suse (H om e O ffi ce, 1998).
It shoul d be not ed, how ever, t hat pol i ci es ai m ed at t ackl i ng drugs m i suse are l i kel y t o be di ffi cul t t o i m pl em ent and eval uat e i f t he underst andi ng of how i l l i ci t drugs m arket s operat e i s l i m i t ed. For exam pl e, i f pol i ci es are desi gned t o rest ri ct suppl y and hence i ncrease t he st reet pri ce for drugs, t hi s w i l l onl y be desi rabl e i f pol i cy m akers are aw are of t he pri ce sensit i vi t y of dem and. U nfort unat el y, unt i l recent l y t he st udy of t he econom i cs of i l l i ci t drugs m arket s has been charact eri sed by a l i t erat ure t hat has an underst andabl e i m bal ance bet w een em pi ri cal and t heoret i cal (or hypot het i cal ) cont ri but i ons. Thi s i m bal ance i s underst andabl e because t he nat ure of i l l i ci t drugs m arket s m akes t he col l ect i on of rel i abl e dat a di ffi cul t . H avi ng sai d t hi s, i n t he absence of rel i abl e dat a, som e i m port ant t heoret i cal advances i nt o our underst andi ng of drug addi ct i on have been m ade. In part i cul ar, econom i st s have sought t o rat i onal i se addi ct i on i n t he sense t hat i t represent s i ndi vi dual l y opt i m al behavi our t hat conform s t o t he cl assi cal not i on of ut i l i t y m axi m i sat i on. The t heory of Rat i onal A ddi ct i on (Becker and M urphy, 1988) represent s t he m ost si gni fi cant t heoret i cal cont ri but i on i n t hi s respect , and i t has heavi l y i nfl uenced t he em pi ri cal w ork t hat has fol l ow ed. W e w i l l consi der t hi s cont ri but i on i n m ore det ai l i n Sect i on 2.
Fort unat el y, i n t he l ast t w o decades sui t abl e dat a have becom e avai l abl e t hat al l ow researchers t o consi der som e of t he i ssues t hat have been t hrow n up by t he t heoret i cal l i t erat ure. Typi cal l y t here are t w o areas t hat recei ve at t ent i on. Fi rst l y, a num ber of at t em pt s have been m ade t o quant i fy som e of t he soci al cost s of i l l i ci t drug use, part i cul arl y product i vi t y effect s and t he rel at i onshi p bet w een drug use and cri m e, al t hough, as w e w i l l see l at er, t he ext ent t o w hi ch t hi s has been successful i n i nfl uenci ng pol i cy i s debat abl e. Secondl y, a consi derabl e proport i on of t he l i t erat ure has focussed on t he dem and for i l l i ci t drugs and how sensi t i ve i t i s t o pri ce changes. In t hi s respect , researchers have al so t ri ed t o det erm i ne t he rel at i onshi p bet w een l egal drug use (al cohol and t obacco) and i l l i ci t drug use, and how changes i n t he pri ce of t he form er m ay affect t he dem and for t he l at t er. H ow ever, al l t hi s research m ust com e w i t h a heal t h w arni ng. Il l i ci t drug use rem ai ns covert , and m uch of t he dat a are from sel f -com pl et i on surveys or are deri ved.
Thi s paper proceeds as fol l ow s. In t he next sect i on w e consi der t he econom i cs of addi ct i on, payi ng part i cul ar at t ent i on t o t he t heory of Rat i onal A ddi t i on, and how i t has been i m pl em ent ed em pi ri cal l y. W e show t hat t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel i s a part i cul arl y i m port ant cont ri but i on t o t he l i t erat ure as i t chal l enges t he vi ew t hat drug users are m yopi c, i rrat i onal , and i nsensi t i ve t o changes i n pri ce. H ow ever, w e al so consi der som e t heoret i cal ext ensi ons t o t he basi c Rat i onal A ddi ct i on fram ew ork, and t ry t o det erm i ne w het her t here i s any evi dence t o cast doubt on t he assum pt i ons t hat dri ve t he m odel . Fol l ow i ng t hi s di scussi on, i n Sect i on 3 w e expl ore t he w el fare econom i cs l i t erat ure t o see w hat i t can offer i n t erm s of anal ysi ng t he soci al cost s of drug abuse. W e st art by present i ng t he basi c fram ew ork for anal ysi s, w hi ch consi ders t he possi bl e di vergence bet w een t he pri vat e cost s faced by drug users i n m aki ng t hei r consum pt i on deci si ons and t he soci al cost s t hat m ay ari se as a consequence of t hi s consum pt i on. W e consi der each possi bl e cause of thi s divergence and det erm i ne w het her t here i s any support i n t he l i t erat ure for t hese concerns. Fol l ow i ng t hi s di scussi on of t he w el fare econom i cs fram ew ork, w e bri efl y t urn our at t ent i on t o t he general pol i cy debat e (i . e. w het her psychoact i ve drugs ought t o be prohi bi t ed or regul at ed). W e concl ude t he paper by scrut i ni si ng current drugs pol i ci es and t he cont ri but i on of econom i cs t o t he form ul at i on and eval uat i on of t hese i nt ervent i ons. In part i cul ar, w e consi der t he m eri t s of suppl y-si de and dem and-si de pol i ci es i n reduci ng drug consum pt i on, and w het her t here i s any evi dence t hat changes i n drugs pri ces have a not i ceabl e effect on consum er dem and. W e fi ni sh t he paper by sum m ari si ng t he m ai n cont ri but i ons t hat em erge from t he econom i cs l i t erat ure.
The Economics of Addiction
A ny anal ysi s of i l l i ci t drugs ul t i m at el y requi res som e refl ect i on on t he nat ure of addi ct i on, part i cul arl y harm ful addi ct i on. A l t hough i t i s argued t hat cert ai n drugs are not associ at ed w i t h addi ct i on (e. g. cannabi s i s oft en cl ai m ed t o be non-addi ct i ve i n a physi cal sense), t he consum pt i on of psychoact i ve drugs i s general l y consi dered t o represent addi ct i ve behavi our.
In econom i cs, a good i s t ypi cal l y defi ned as addi ct i ve i f an i ncrease i n t he st ock of past consum pt i on resul t s i n an i ncrease i n current consum pt i on, cet eri s pari bus (Becker et al . , 1994) . The pri m ary concern for econom i st s i s w het her or not t he consum pt i on of addi ct i ve goods represent s i ndi vi dual l y opt i m al behavi our, or w het her addi ct ed peopl e behave i rrat i onal l y. The l at t er argum ent w as seri ousl y quest i oned by t he publ i cat i on of Becker and M urphy's (1988) t heory of Rat i onal A ddi ct i on, w hi ch bui l t upon a m odel of addi ct i on i nt roduced by St i gl er and Becker (1977) .
Rational Addiction
In t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel , addi ct ed i ndi vi dual s are show n t o exhi bi t consi st ent , forw ard-l ooki ng and i ndi vi dual l y opt i m al behavi our. The Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel has been w i del y di scussed si nce i t s publ i cat i on, and i n t hi s sect i on w e provi de a bri ef exposi t i on of t he t heory (for m ore det ai l ed di scussi ons see G rossm an et N eri and H eat her, 1995; and St evenson, 1994b , and for a rei nt erpret at i on of t he m odel see Ferguson, 2000) . 1 The Becker-M urphy t heory of Rat i onal A ddi ct i on proceeds as fol l ow s. Indi vi dual s can consum e t w o t ypes of good: one t hat i s addi ct i ve (c) and a com posi t e of non-addi ct i ve goods (y). U t i l i t y at t i m e t , u(t), i s assum ed t o be dependent on current consum pt i on of t he addi ct i ve good, c(t), and nonaddi ct i ve goods, y(t), pl us a m easure of previ ous addi ct i ve consum pt i on, cal l ed t he st ock of consum pt i on capi t al ( S). The st ock of consum pt i on capi t al capt ures t he process of l earni ng about t he effect s of t he addi ct i ve goods t hrough previ ous consum pt i on experi ence (e. g. t he rel i ef from st ress or si m pl e escape from real i t y gai ned t hrough consum i ng 'm i nd-al t eri ng' 1 A l so, for a m ore general di scussion of t he econom i cs of habi t form at i on and addi cti on see M essini s (1999) and Becker (1992) ; and for an overview of both econom ic and other approaches t o addicti on see Buck et al. (1996) and M ontoya and A t kinson (2000) . drugs), pl us previ ous l i fe experi ences. Thi s st ock ent ers t he ut i l i t y funct i on as i t affect s t he sat i sfact i on deri ved from current consum pt i on. W r i t t en form al l y, ut i l i t y at t i m e t i s gi ven by:
The st ock of consum pt i on capi t al or 'addi ct i ve st ock' i s t reat ed as a si m pl e i nvest m ent funct i on, w hi ch depreci at es at a rat e d (w hi ch represent s t he depl et i on of t he physi cal and m ent al effect s of past consum pt i on). The rat e of change of t hi s addi ct i ve st ock i s gi ven by:
If i ndi vi dual s l i ve for l engt h of l i fe T, and have a const ant rat e of t i m e preference, s, t hen an i ndi vi dual 's di scount ed l i fe-t i m e ut i l i t y i s gi ven by:
w hi ch, accordi ng t o rat i onal choi ce t heory, an i ndi vi dual w i l l m axi m i se subj ect t o an expendi t ure const rai nt and t he i nvest m ent const rai nt (2). The expendi t ure const rai nt i s a funct i on of w eal t h at t i m e t , t he i nt erest rate i n a perfect l y com pet i t i ve capi t al m arket , t he pri ce of t he addi ct i ve good (t he pri ce of t he com posi t e good, y, i s norm al i sed t o 1), and t he i ncom e per peri od. In addi t i on t o t hese t w o const rai nt s, i t i s assum ed t hat consum pt i on of c i n peri od t i s non-negat i ve, and t hat w eal t h i n t he fol l ow i ng peri od m ust be posi t i ve.
The fi nal part of t he m odel i s t o rel at e t hi s rat i onal choi ce of ut i l i t y m axi m i sat i on t o addi ct i ve behavi our. Tw o i m port ant aspect s of addi ct i ve behavi our are consi dered, bot h of w hi ch rel at e t o t he consum pt i on capi t al st ock. Fi rst l y, i t i s assum ed t hat harm ful addi ct i on i s charact eri sed by t he physi ol ogi cal propert y of t ol erance: "gi ven l evel s of consum pt i on are l ess sat i sfyi ng w hen past consum pt i on has been great er" (Becker and M urphy, 1988, p. 682) . In ot her w ords, t he m ore an i ndi vi dual has consum ed i n peri od t -1, t he l ow er t he m argi nal ut i l i t y of consum pt i on i n peri od t (i . e. hi gher l evel s of consum pt i on are requi red t o yi el d t he sam e 2 A l t ernat i vel y, m ore struct ur e coul d be i m posed on t he ut i l i t y funct i on by assum ing t hat c(t ) and S(t ) enter i nt o uti l i t y via an interm edi ate producti on functi on, w here the out put is som ething li ke euphori a or pleasure (Chal oupka, 1991). ut i l i t y). Thus, assum i ng ut i l i t y at t i m e t i s a concave funct i on requi res t hat
The second charact eri st i c of addi ct i on i s t he rei nforcem ent effect ,
, w hereby great er past consum pt i on rai ses t he m argi nal ut i l i t y of current consum pt i on, and hence l eads t o an i ncrease i n current and fut ure consum pt i on (i . e. current and past consum pt i on are com pl em ent s). Thus i t i s assum ed t hat .
If addi ct s w ere not rat i onal t hey w oul d onl y pay at t ent i on t o t he rei nforcem ent effect , but i n t hi s m odel drug users are rat i onal and so m ust t ake i nt o account bot h effect s. Thus Becker and M urphy show t hat t he rei nforcem ent effect m ust out w ei gh t he t ol erance effect . In ot her w ords, t he posi t i ve effect of an i ncrease i n t he st ock of consum pt i on on t he m argi nal ut i l i t y of current consum pt i on m ust exceed t he negat i ve effect of a great er st ock of consum pt i on on t he fut ure harm from great er current consum pt i on (Buck et al . , 1996) .
W e can now bri ng t he com ponent s of t he m odel t oget her t o see how addi ct i ve behavi our i s char act eri sed by rat i onal i t y. Fol l ow i ng Becker et al . (1991) , t he i m pl i cat i ons of t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel are i l l ust rat ed graphi cal l y i n Fi gure 1. The curve A 1 rel at es consum pt i on t o t he addi ct i ve st ock for an i ndi vi dual w i t h a gi ven concave ut i l i t y funct i on, rat e of t i m e preference, set pri ces for addi ct i ve and non-addi ct i ve goods, and gi ven w eal t h. It can be t hought of as a dem and curve for t he addi ct i ve good. The ray from t he ori gi n, c(t)=dS, i s t he st eady st at e l i ne w here current consum pt i on of t he addi ct i ve good j ust offset s t he depreci at i on of t he st ock of consum pt i on capi t al . If A 1 i s bel ow t he st eady st at e l i ne, current consum pt i on does not offset t he decl i ne i n consum pt i on st ock. Thi s m eans t hat S begi ns t o fal l and t hus so does consum pt i on of c, t ow ards abst ent i on. Conversel y, i f A 1 i s above t he st eady st at e l i ne, consum pt i on and t he addi ct i ve st ock i ncrease, and t he addi ct i ve habi t persi st s. W e can t hus use Fi gure 1 t o expl ore a num ber of drug use experi ences, even t hose w here t he i ni t i al endow m ent of S i s zero. In al l cases, t he am ount of consum pt i on capi t al rel at i ve t o current consum pt i on w i l l det erm i ne t he behavi our of t he addi ct (or even som eone experi m ent i ng w i t h drugs).
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Fi gure 1. A ddi ct i ve behavi our and t he st ock of consum pt i on capi t al Cent ral t o t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on t heory i s t he exi st ence of m ul t i pl e poi nt s of equi l i bri um , or unst abl e equi l i bri um , and t he com pl em ent ari t y of consum pt i on bet w een peri ods. In Fi gure 1 t here are t w o equi l i bri um poi nt s, E 1 and E 2 , t he fi rst of w hi ch i s unst abl e.
To see w hy, consi der a user i n equi l i bri um at E 1 , w i t h current consum pt i on c 1 and st ock of consum pt i on capi t al S 1 . Thi s poi nt i s not st abl e because any exogenous shock t o t he st ock of consum pt i on capi t al w i l l cause a perm anent m ove ei t her t o abst ent i on or t o t he hi gher equi l i bri um , E 2 . For exam pl e, fol l ow i ng N eri and H eat her (1995), suppose t he user experi ences a negat i ve l i fe event (say t he l oss of a j ob or di vorce) t hat causes S 1 t o i ncrease (on t he assum pt i on t hat a negat i ve l i fe experi ence st rengt hens t he rel at i ve euphori c effect of past drug consum pt i ons). Thi s i n t urn causes consum pt i on t o i ncrease al ong A 1 and t hus, due t o rei nforcem ent , t he st ock furt her i ncreases so t hat event ual l y t he hi gher equi l i bri um of E 2 i s reached. O n t he ot her hand, i f t he i ni t i al shock w as posi t i ve (say t he bi rt h of a new chi l d), t hen S 1 w i l l decrease, causi ng consum pt i on t o decrease and event ual l y t he user abst ai ns from drugs al t oget her as t he depl et i on of t he st ock exceeds current consum pt i on.Thi s i s si m i l ar t o t he experi ence of t hose w ho experi m ent w i t h drugs but do not becom e regul ar users. I f i ni t i al consum pt i on i s zero and t he st ock i s l ess t han S 1 , an experi m ent w i t h drugs, say as a resul t of curi osi t y, resul t s i n a consum pt i on l evel t hat i s not suffi ci ent t o offset t he depl et i on of t he c(t )=δS capi t al st ock and so event ual l y t he i ndi vi dual ret urns t o abst ent i on.Consi deri ng E 2 , i t i s cl ear t hat changes i n t he st ock w i l l be sm oot hed aw ay over t i m e so t hat E 2 rem ai ns a st abl e equi l i bri um . For exam pl e, i f S 2 w ere t o be i ncreased t hi s w i l l i ni t i al l y cause consum pt i on t o ri se above c 2 , m ovi ng t he user ri ght w ard al ong A 1 . Over t i m e as t he depreci at i on of t he st ock i s not ful l y offset by consum pt i on t he st ock begi ns t o fal l and equi l i bri um i s event ual l y rest ored at E 2 .
D espi t e i t s i nt ui t i ve appeal , t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on fram ew ork i s l i m i t ed i n som e respect s. A m ore det ai l ed di scussi on of t he m ai n cri t i ci sm s of t he m odel i s gi ven l at er, but i t i s w ort h not i ng t hat i t i s not cl ear w hat happens t o t he m odel 's predi ct i ons i f som e of t he assum pt i ons are rel axed. For exam pl e, i t coul d be argued t hat t here i s consi derabl e uncert ai nty about di scount rat es. Becker and M urphy argue t hat poorer or l ess educat ed i ndi vi dual s are l i kel y t o di scount t hei r fut ures heavi l y as t hey t ake account of t he fut ure consequences of t hei r current act i ons l ess t han ot hers. H ow ever, Buck et al . (1996) suggest t hat t hese i ndi vi dual s are probabl y l ess cert ai n about t hei r fut ures t han, say, t hose from m i ddl e cl ass or w el l -educat ed fam i l i es. Thi s suggest s t hat di scount rat es are l i kel y t o be a funct i on of uncert ai nt y, and as such m ay vary accordi ng t o l i fe changes or publ i c pol i cy ai m ed at reduci ng uncert ai nt y.
A not her area of uncert ai nt y i s t he i ndi vi dual 's l i fespan, w hi ch m ay be endogenousl y det erm i ned w i t h t he choi ce of drug consum pt i on. Q ui t e how uncert ai nt y changes t he predi ct i ons of t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel i s not cl ear, al t hough i t i s an area t hat requi res m ore research.
Rational Addiction, Price Changes and Demand
Fi gure 1 can al so be used t o i l l ust rat e t he effect of pol i cy i nt ervent i ons on t he dem and for drugs. Lat er, w e provi de a det ai l ed di scussi on of current pol i cy i nt ervent i ons. In t hi s sect i on, how ever, w e bri efl y consi der t he effect of pri ces changes on t he dem and for drugs usi ng t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on fram ew ork. Suppose t he i ndi vi dual i s at poi nt E 2 on t he st eady st at e l i ne i n Fi gure 2. 1, w i t h consum pt i on c 2 and st ock S 2 . N ow consi der w hat happens i f t he ret ai l pri ce (or effect i ve cost ) of t he addi ct i ve drug fal l s si gni fi cant l y, say, as a consequence of l egal i sat i on. The fal l i n pri ce causes dem and t o i ncrease for every possi bl e st ock of consum pt i on, w hi ch shi ft s t he dem and curve up t o A 2 ,cet eri s pari bus. Ini t i al l y, for a gi ven st ock of consum pt i on, t he i ndi vi dual w i l l rai se consum pt i on up t o t he poi nt 2 E′ on t he new dem and curve. H ow ever, si nce 2 E′ i s above t he st eady st at e l i ne, t he i ncrease i n consum pt i on m ore t han off -set s t he depreci at i on of t he st ock, and t hus consum pt i on grow s unt i l t he new st eady st at e equi l i bri um i s reached at E 3 w i t h t he hi gher consum pt i on l evel c 3 . Thi s i s i n st ark cont rastt o convent i onal t hi nki ng, w hi ch suggest s t hat addi ct s are t ypi cal l y un-responsi ve t o changes i n pri ce. Becker et al . (1991) , concl ude: 'i f anyt hi ng, rat i onal addi ct s respond m ore t o pri ce changes i n t he l ong run t han do nonadi ct s' (p. 239).
Implementing Rational Addiction Empirically
In t he previ ous sect i on w e saw t hat t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel al l ow s us t o predi ct t he i m pact of pri ce changes on consum pt i on and hence eval uat e pol i cy proposal s. In t hi s sect i on w e consi der how t he m odel has been t est ed em pi ri cal l y. The Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel has been i m pl em ent ed i n a num ber of cont ext s, i ncl udi ng ci garet t e consum pt i on (Bardsl ey and O l ekal ns, 1999; Becker et al . , 1994; Cam eron, 1997; Chal oupka, 1991; Labeaga, 1999) ; i l l i ci t drug use (G rossm an and Chal oupka, 1998); al cohol consum pt i on (G rossm an et al . , 1998b; W at ers and Sl oan, 1995); coffee consum pt i on (O l ekal ns and Bardsl ey, 1996); and t he dem and for ci nem a (Cam eron, 1999). A bri ef sum m ary of t he em pi ri cal appl i cat i ons of t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel i s gi ven i n G rossm an et al . (1998b) . The m aj ori t y of t hese st udi es provi de support i ng evi dence for rat i onal addi ct i on i n t hat t hey report negat i ve and si gni fi cant pri ce effect s and posi t i ve and si gni fi cant past and fut ure consum pt i on effect s. In t hi s sect i on w e w i l l focus on t he pract i cal i t i es of i m pl em ent i ng t he m odel and consi der t he em pi ri cal fi ndi ng l at er i n Sect i on 2. 5 w hen w e l ook at t he effect of drug pri ces on consum pt i on. W e wi l l focus i n part i cul ar on usi ng t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel i n t he cont ext of anal ysi ng i l l i ci t drug use, al t hough i t w as fi rst used t o consi der ci garet t e consum pt i on (Chal oupka, 1991).
U nfort unat el y, due t o di ffi cul t i es i n obt ai ni ng dat a, t here are very few st udi es t hat have consi dered t he dem and for i l l i ci t drugs i n t he cont ext of t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel . A s such, w e w i l l concent rat e on a uni que st udy by G rossm an and Chal oupka (1998), t hat focuses on t he pri ce el ast i ci t y of dem and for cocai ne. A ssum i ng a quadrat i c ut i l i t y funct i on and a rat e of t i m e preference for t he present equal t o t he m arket rat e of i nt erest , Becker at al . (1994) show t hat Equat i on (1) generat es a l i near di fference equat i on for current consum pt i on (t erm ed a st ruct ural dem and funct i on by G rossm an and Chal oupka) of t he form : 4
In (4) c t -1 and c t +1 are past and fut ure consum pt i on respect i vel y (see bel ow for how t he l at t er i s observed), P t i s t he current pri ce of c t , (ot her det erm i nant s of current consum pt i on are suppressed),b i s t he t i m e di scount fact or (equal t o t he reci procal of one pl us t he rat e of t i m e preference for t he present , and assum ed t o be l ess t han one) 5 ,q 1 capt ures t he effect of pri ce on dem and, and e t i s an error t erm capt uri ng unobservabl e l i fe-cycl e experi ences t hat affect consum pt i on. The param et er q m easures t he effect of a change i n past consum pt i on on t he m argi nal ut i l i t y of current consum pt i on, and by sym m et ry, t he effect of a change i n fut ure consum pt i on on t he m argi nal ut i l i t y of current consum pt i on. In ot her w ords, t hi s param et er rel at es t o t he rei nforcem ent effect , t he great er t he val ue of q, t he l arger i s t he degree of rei nforcem ent . Thi s speci fi cat i on al so em beds t he i dea of adj acent com pl em ent ari t y, as changes i n past or fut ure consum pt i on w i l l resul t i n a change i n current consum pt i on. In t erm s of t est i ng t he pl ausi bi l i t y of t he m odel , i f addi ct i on i s i gnored t hen onl y q 1 w i l l be si gni fi cant .
If how ever, consum pt i on i s addi ct i ve, but addi ct s are m yopi c i n t he sense t hat t hey i gnore fut ure consum pt i on, t hen onl y q 1 and coeffi ci ent est i m at e for past consum pt i on w i l l be si gni fi cant . In t he cont ext of t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel w e expect al l t he param et ers t o be si gni fi cant (and posi t i ve except for q 1 ).
Est i m at i on of (4) i s rel at i vel y st rai ght forw ard, al t hough O LS est i m at i on w i l l resul t i n bi ased est i m at es of t he param et ers of i nt erest because t he unobservabl e com ponent s t hat affect ut i l i t y i n each peri od w i l l m ost l i kel y be correl at ed. G rossm an and Chal oupka (1998) get around t hi s probl em of endogenei t y of past and fut ure consum pt i on by est i m at i ng t he dem and funct i on usi ng t w o-st age l east squares. A s st at ed, equat i on (2. 4) i m pl i es t hat c t i s i ndependent of past and fut ure pri ces, t hei r effect onl y com i ng i ndi rect l y t hrough changes i n past or fut ure consum pt i on. Thus, provi ded t he unobservabl e com ponent s are uncorrel at ed w i t h pri ces, past and fut ure pri ces can be used as i nst rum ent s for past and fut ure consum pt i on, respect i vel y.
The l ast em pi ri cal i ssue t o consi der concerns dat a and a consi derabl e proport i on of t he G rossm an and Chal oupka paper i s dedi cat ed t o a l engt hy di scussi on of how t hey generat ed dat a appropri at e for est i m at i ng t he m odel . G rossm an and Chal oupka use panel dat a from t he U ni versi t y of M i chi gan's M oni t ori ng t he Fut ure research program . D at a on a represent at i ve sam pl e of bet w een 15, 000 and 19, 000 hi gh school seni ors have been col l ect ed for t hi s program every year si nce 1975 (see Johnst on et al . (1995) for m ore det ai l s). Int ervi ew ees are asked about t hei r use of m ari j uana (cannabi s) and a num ber of ot her com m onl y abused drugs i ncl udi ng cocai ne, and fol l ow-up surveys are carri ed out peri odi cal l y (provi di ng up t o fi ve observat i ons on each i ndi vi dual i n t he dat a used by G rossm an and Chal oupka). Thi s peri odi c revi ew effect i vel y provi des i nform at i on on past , current and fut ure consum pt i on by al l ow i ng t he l ags and l eads of t he m i ddl e observat i on t o coi nci de w i t h past and fut ure consum pt i on, respect i vel y. Pri ce i nform at i on i s t aken from t he Syst em t o Ret ri eve Inform at i on from D rug Evi dence (STRID E), w hi ch i s m ai nt ai ned by t he U S D rug Enforcem ent A dm i ni st rat i on (see Caul ki ns (1995a Caul ki ns ( ) or D i N ardo (1993 for m ore det ai l s). G rossm an and Chal oupka focus on cocai ne i n t hei r st udy and proceed t o est i m at e t he ful l cost of cocai ne by geographi c l ocat i on over t i m e. 6 Agai n, as wi t h consum pt i on, l ags and l eads are used t o creat e past and fut ure real Fi nal l y, i n t erm s of pri ce el ast i ci t i es, G rossm an and Chal oupka report est i m at es t hat suggest t hat drug users are l i kel y t o be sensi t i ve t o pri ce changes, a resul t w hi ch i s consi st ent w i t h t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel . They fi nd a l ong-run pri ce el ast i ci t y of dem and for cocai ne of -1. 35 and a sm al l er short -run el ast i ci t y of -0. 96. Thi s i s al so consi st ent w i t h t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel . A s w e di scussed i n t he previ ous sect i on, t he m odel predi ct s t hat t he i ni t i al react i on t o a pri ce change i s represent ed by a m ove t o a di fferent dem and curve (from A 1 t o A 2 i n Fi gure 2. 1 i n t he case of a pri ce drop), fol l ow ed by a m ovem ent al ong t he new curve t o t he st abl e st eady st at e equi l i bri um (poi nt E 3 i n Fi gure 1).
Beyond Rational Addiction
A l t hough t here have been a num ber of report edl y successful at t em pt s t o i m pl em ent t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel em pi ri cal l y (al t hough rarel y i n t he cont ext of i l l i ci t drug use due t o l ack of appropri at e dat a), t he m odel i t sel f at t ract s m any cri t i cs, al bei t from m ai nl y noneconom i st s. In t hi s sect i on w e bri efl y consi der som e of t he cri t i ci sm s t hat have been l evel l ed at t he m odel and m ent i on som e of t he ext ensi ons t o t he m odel t hat have been proposed. 7 W e do not focus on t he fundam ent al debat e bet w een proponent s of t he rat i onal choi ce vi ew of addi ct i on and t hose t hat consi der addi ct s t o be t ot al l y m yopi c w i t h t i m e-i nconsi st ent preferences and onl y i nt erest ed i n i m m edi at e grat i fi cat i on (see M ochri e, 1996; O 'D onoghue and Rabi n, 1999 Rabi n, , 2000 . Rat her, w e w i l l focus on cri t i ci sm s and ext ensi ons t o t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel t hat are based on econom i c rat her t han behavi oural sci ence consi derat i ons.
O ne cri t i ci sm of t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel i s t hat i t t akes no account of i ndi vi dual s'
regret about t hei r addi ct i ve consum pt i on. Cri t i cs cl ai m t hat i t i s unreasonabl e t o assum e t hat addi ct s choose t o ri sk addi ct i on i n t he know l edge t hat i t present s pot ent i al fut ure harm (t ypi cal l y t he non-rat i onal approach assum es t hat addi ct i on ari ses from a com pul si ve act carri ed out w i t hout any consi derat i on of t he fut ure). O rphani des and Zervos (1995) at t em pt t o overcom e t hi s probl em by i ncorporat i ng t he process of l earni ng and regret i nt o t he Rat i onal 7 M odifi cati ons of t he m odel t hat are specifi c t o cert ain goods are not considered here. For exam ple, Suranovic et al . (1999) , and i n response, Jones (1999) , have devel oped m odel s of cigarett e addicti on t hat are based on t he Rat i onal A ddicti on m odel but reinterpret som e of t he assum pti ons t o i ncorporate t he adjustm ent cost approach t o addi cti on.
A ddi ct i on m odel . The basi c prem i se i s t hat i ndi vi dual s do not know t hei r addi ct i ve t endenci es unt i l t hey have act ual l y experi m ent ed w i t h t he pot ent i al l y addi ct i ve good (l earni ng), but t hat for som e i ndi vi dual s t hi s experi m ent at i on al t ers t he st ock of consum pt i on capi t al such t hat t hey event ual l y fol l ow an addi ct i ve pat h. H ad t hese i ndi vi dual s know n t hi s addi ct i ve out com e before t hey st art ed experi m ent i ng (i . e. t hey had accurat el y form ul at ed t hei r pri or probabi l i t y of addi ct i on before experi m ent i ng) t hen t hey w oul d probabl y not have st art ed i n t he fi rst pl ace (regret ). Thi s i nvol ves separat i ng t he i ndi vi dual 's ut i l i t y funct i on i nt o t w o part s:
, i s t he posi t i ve i m pact of consum pt i on of bot h goods on ut i l i t y w hi l st t he second t erm ,
, represent s t he possi bl e det ri m ent al effect s from past consum pt i on of t he addi ct i ve good. These effect s occur w i t h probabi l i t y x t , w hi ch depends on t he l evel of past consum pt i on and i s di st ri but ed as:
The The i nt egrat i on of l earni ng and regret i nt o t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel represent s a subt l e m odi fi cat i on of t he basi c m odel t hat appears t o count er t he argum ent s put forw ard by cri t i cs w ho cl ai m t hat t he rat i onal fram ew ork cannot expl ai n i ni t i at i on i nt o addi ct i on.
H ow ever, a m ore fundam ent al cri t i ci sm of t he m odel concerns i t s assum pt i on t hat i ndi vi dual rat e of t i m e preferences are fi xed and t i m e-consi st ent . 8 If t he rat e of t i m e preference i s fi xed, t hi s m eans t hat t here i s a const ant t rade-off bet w een t he pl easure of current consum pt i on and fut ure ut i l i t y, w hi ch w oul d i m pl y t hat t here i s no di fference bet w een t he w ay addi ct s and nonaddi ct s l ook t o t he fut ure. U nfort unat el y t hi s i s i ncom pat i bl e w i t h t he observed behavi our of addi ct s t hat appears t o suggest t hat t hey focus on i m m edi at e grat i fi cat i on w i t hout concern for t he fut ure. In response t o t hi s cri t i ci sm , O rphani des and Zervos (1998) present an ext ensi on t o t he basi c m odel t hat appears t o reconci l e t hi s probl em . They rej ect t he non-rat i onal approach t hat has m yopi a as t he cause of addi ct i on, and ret ai n t he i dea of ut i l i t y m axi m i sat i on. The key t o t hei r ext ensi on of t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel i s t o al l ow t he rat e of t i m e preference t o be det erm i ned endogenousl y. Thus, i ncreases i n past consum pt i on of t he addi ct i ve good w i l l have a posi t i ve i m pact on t he i ndi vi dual 's rat e of t i m e preference and i nduce a form of m yopi a. In t hi s cont ext , t he i ni t i at i on i nt o addi ct i on i ncreases t he desi rabi l i t y of current abst ent i on, and t o reoccurrence). U l t i m at el y, t he effect of al l ow i ng t he rat e of t i m e preference t o be affect ed by addi ct i ve behavi our i s t hat m yopi c behavi our i s a consequence of addi ct i on, rat her t han i t s cause (as i s t he case of t he non-rat i onal approach).
Thi s area has al so been consi dered em pi ri cal l y. In a uni que st udy, Bret t evi l l e-Jensen (1999) has expl ored em pi ri cal l y t he assum pt i on of st abl e rat e of t i m e preferences, w hi ch requi res t hat al t hough drug users and non-users shoul d exhi bi t di fferences i n t hei r di scount rat es, current users and ex-users shoul d not . The di fferences bet w een non-users and users i s t hat t he l at t er w i l l have a hi gher rat e of t i m e preference and t hus heavi l y di scount t he fut ure adverse consequences of t hei r consum pt i on i n favour of current grat i fi cat i on. H ow ever, t he di sti nct i on bet w een users and ex-users shoul d not be due t o di fferences i n t he di scount rat e. A ddi ct i on m odel as i t em phasi ses t hat i ndi vi dual di fferences i n di scount rat es can hel p expl ai n addi ct i on, but as preferences are assum ed st abl e, t ransi t i ons bet w een addi ct i on and non-use 9 A n ex user is defi ned as som eone w ho had previously been a long-t erm abuser of heroi n or am phet am ines, alt hough no i nform at i on i s given on how l ong t hey l ast used t he drug. 10 A l t hough you could argue that ex-users are just another self-selected group w ho on average have di fferent (fixed) discount rates.
are a consequence of t he change i n addi ct i ve st ock onl y. Bret t evi l l e-Jensen suggest s t hat t he assum pt i on of st abl e preferences does not hol d and t hat i t i s qui t e l i kel y t hat rat 
The Welfare Economics of Drug Prohibition
In t he previ ous sect i on w e consi dered t he econom i cs of addi ct i on and how t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel provi des an econom i c fram ew ork for t hi nki ng about addi ct i ve behavi our. In and q 1 t he t ot al cost s of drug use are great er t han t he benefi t s). In t hi s sense, effi ci ency can be i m proved by governm ent i nt ervent i on t hat reduces consum pt i on from q 1 t o q 2 (not e t hat i f t he ext ernal cost s are bi g enough, q 2 w i l l correspond t o t he ori gi n, t hat i s, zero consum pt i on or absol ut e prohi bi t i on).
H ow ever, gi ven t hi s si m pl e fram ew ork, i t i s di ffi cul t t o fi nd a convi nci ng case for drug prohi bi t i on i n t he l i t erat ure of w el fare econom i cs. O n t he cont rary, econom i st s are m ore l i kel y There i s perhaps l i t t l e doubt t hat t here i s som e correl at i on bet w een drug use and cri m e.
Drugs and Crime
H ow ever, t here i s very l i t t l e evi dence t o support any not i on of causal i t y bet w een drug use and cri m e (or vi ce versa). Benson et al . (1992) concl ude t hat i t i s t he i l l egal i t y of drugs use t hat can l ead t o cri m e, not t he drug use i t sel f. In ot her w ords, rat her t han t here bei ng a psycho-12 It is w ort h noti ng that the sam ple of 506 arrestees used in the N EW -A D A M research i s derived from an avail able populati on of 2971 arrestees t hat passed t hrough t he custody blocks i n t he four poli ce stati ons studied over a 30-day peri od. Thi s represents a l oss of 83% , over half of w hi ch w as due t o t he short stay of t he arrestee at the pol i ce stati on t hat m eant that the i nt ervi ew er had i nsuffi cient ti m e t o m ake cont act. Thi s in i t self raises som e doubts about t he representati ve nat ure of t he sam ple. pharm acol ogi cal expl anat i on of t he correl at i on bet w een drug use and cri m e (e. g. "m ost burgl ars are on drugs"), i t i s m ore l i kel y t hat i t can be expl ai ned by a fi nanci ng-consum pt i on expl anat i on. In t hi s cont ext , m any aut hors i n addi t i on t o Benson et al have quest i oned t he supposed l i nk bet w een drug use and cri m e. In a syst em at i c revi ew of t he cost s and benefi t s of drug prohi bi t i on, M i ron and Zw i ebel (1995) concl ude t hat as drugs pri ces are t ypi cal l y rai sed as a resul t of prohi bi t i on, i t i s prohi bi t i on i t sel f t hat i s t he pri m ary cause of cri m e associ at ed That drugs pol i ci es m ay be t he 'cause' of cri m e due t o drug users' di ffi cul t i es i n l egal l y fi nanci ng t hei r habi t present s a probl em for t he w el fare econom i cs fram ew ork. The ext ernal cost of cri m e i s onl y rel evant i f t he cri m e i s a di rect resul t of t he drug use, and not as a consequence of i nt ervent i ons desi gned t o t ackl e drug use. U nfort unat el y, i t i s som ew hat di ffi cul t t o prove t he fi nanci ng-consum pt i on expl anat i on em pi ri cal l y gi ven t hat t here have been few i nst ances, i f any, i n w hi ch t he sam e cohort of drug users has experi enced l egal and i l l egal drugs m arket s. A not her di ffi cul t y w i t h t hi s hypot hesi s i s w i t h regards t o t he i m pact of enforcem ent pol i ci es upon pri ce. The argum ent s di scussed above assum e (underst andabl y) t hat drug pri ces are hi gher i n t he prohi bi t ed m arket t han t hey w oul d be i n a l egal m arket .
H ow ever, t hi s i s anot her area of debat e (see l at er) i n w hi ch t here are few em pi ri cal resul t s t o provi de gui dance.
Increased burden on publicly provided health care
It w oul d seem appropri at e t hat i f a soci et y col l ect i vel y pays for heal t h care so t hat t he m argi nal cost t o t he pat i ent i s (effect i vel y) zero, t hen t he st at e has a l egi t i m at e i nt erest i n t he heal t h of every i ndi vi dual i n t hat soci et y. Thi s suggest s t hat w here an i ndi vi dual 's consum pt i on choi ces are i m posi ng an addi t i onal burden on publ i cl y provi ded heal t h care t hen t hat act i vi t y shoul d be di scouraged. Such i s t he case w i t h drug consum pt i on i f w e accept t hat t here are cert ai n heal t h ri sks associ at ed w i t h t hat choi ce (al t hough i t i s by no m eans cert ai n t hat t hi s i s t he case w i t h al l drugs and/ or i ndi vi dual s). (1993), w ho concedes t hat t he heal t h effect s of drug use are onl y a concern due t o t he m eans of m edi cal provi si on. In ot her w ords, i f t here w as a free m arket i n m edi ci ne accom pani ed by a m arket for m edi cal i nsurance, t he heal t h-rel at ed argum ent s for prohi bi t i on vi rt ual l y di sappear.
'Demerit' Goods
That i ndi vi dual s shoul d be di scouraged from cert ai n consum pt i on choi ces because t hey are not act i ng i n t hei r ow n best i nt erest i s t he cl assi c pat ernal i st argum ent for prohi bi t i on of drugs.
Excl udi ng any pot ent i al ext ernal cost s ari si ng from consum pt i on of drugs, how ever, t he proposi t i on t hat drug users are not act i ng i n t hei r ow n best i nt erest s i s di ffi cul t t o cont end w i t h for m any reasons. Cul yer (1973) A si m pl er argum ent can be ext ended from t hi s. O ne si m pl y has t o w onder w hy i t i s t hat t he 'rest of soci et y' know s about t he probl em s associ at ed w i t h drug use w hereas t he i ndi vi dual drug user does not . Cl earl y t hi s i s not t he case i f, as w i t h sm okers, i ndi vi dual s m ake t hei r choi ces i n t he know l edge (or at l east part know l edge) of t he ri sks associ at ed w i t h t hei r consum pt i on (t hi s i s t he essence of t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel ). In effect w hat w e are consi deri ng are i ssues of personal choi ce and t he rest ri ct i on of t hat choi ce em bodi ed i n argum ent s concerni ng m eri t or 'dem eri t ' goods. In reference t o i ndi vi dual s w ho choose t o t ake st i m ul ant s, M i l l (1991/ 1859, p. 111) concl udes t hat 't hei r choi ce of pl easures, and t hei r m ode of expendi ng t hei r i ncom e, aft er sat i sfyi ng t hei r l egal and m oral obl i gat i ons t o t he St at e and t o i ndi vi dual s, are t hei r ow n concern, and m ust rest w i t h t hei r ow n j udgem ent '. Bl ock (1996) form al i ses t hi s argum ent w i t h reference t o t he gai ns i n w el fare resul t i ng from t w o i ndi vi dual s t radi ng i n current l y prohi bi t ed goods. Bl ock argues t hat t he w el fare of t hi rd part i es, assum i ng t hei r ri ght s t o person and propert y are not bei ng vi ol at ed, shoul d be di sregarded i n t hi s cont ext : … A t hird party can verball y oppose any given t rade. But t hat opposit i on cannot be revealed through m arket choi ces in t he sam e w ay t hat t rade bet w een t he t w o part i es i ndicates a posit i ve evaluati on of t he t ransacti on.
(Bl ock, 1996, p. 434).
The probl em econom i st s face w i t h respect t o t hese argum ent s i s t hat t here are no t ool s for 'm easuri ng' subj ect i ve val ues such t hat t he ext ernal i t i es and m eri t goods fram ew orks are com pat i bl e. Indeed, even i f t here exi st ed such a m easure, t he phi l osophi cal and et hi cal probl em s w oul d st i l l rem ai n.
Productivity and Labour Supply
A frequent l y ci t ed consequence of i l l i ci t drug use i s i t s i m pact on l abour force part i ci pat i on, part i cul arl y w i t h respect t o chroni c absent eei sm . The pri m ary concern i n t hi s respect i s t hat reduced l abour m arket experi ence of drug users w i l l ul t i m at el y resul t i n a l ow er aggregat e l evel of hum an capi t al accum ul at i on w hi ch w i ll t end t o reduce overal l product i vi t y and hence l i vi ng st andards i n a com pet i t i ve gl obal m arket . In ot her w ords, t here i s an ext ernal cost bei ng (1994) and W i ni ck (1991), w hi ch suggest s t hat i f anyt hi ng, except for t he heavi est users, t here exi st s a posi t i ve rel at i onshi p bet w een i ndi vi dual earni ngs and sel f -report ed drug use or at l east no negat i ve rel at i onshi p. The m ot i vat i on for quest i oni ng t he rel at i onshi p bet w een drug use and l abour m arket out com es i s t he recogni t i on of t he possi bl e si m ul t anei t y of drug use and w ages, and t he exi st ence of unobserved het erogenei t y, w hi ch rai se quest i ons about t he di rect i on of causal i t y i n a w age equat i on i nvol vi ng a m easure of drug use as an expl anat ory vari abl e.
The rel at i onshi p bet w een subst ance abuse and l abour m arket st at us t ends not t o generat e any consensus i n t he l i t erat ure. For exam pl e, al t hough m ost econom i st s w oul d argue t hat subst ance abuse w i l l i m pact on l abour suppl y, perhaps t hrough som e det ri m ent al effect on heal t h, t here are som e t hat argue t hat i t i s unem pl oym ent t hat t ends t o fost er drug use, rat her t han t he reverse (Peck and Pl ant , 1987) . W here t here i s agreem ent over t he l i kel y di rect i on of A l l t hese st udi es deal w i t h t he i ssue of endogenei t y of subst ance abuse and l abour m arket out com es i n st andard w ays, yet t here appears t o be a l ack of consensus i n t he resul t s. In addi t i on t o t he associ at i on bet w een drug use and unem pl oym ent , t here i s a grow i ng body of em pi ri cal evi dence i n t he l abour econom i cs l i t erat ure t hat suggest s t hat once endogenei t y i s account ed for, one rarel y fi nds a si gni fi cant negat i ve rel at i onshi p bet w een subst ance abuse and w ages. K aest ner (1991), usi ng dat a from t he N LSY , fi nds t hat , i f anyt hi ng, i ncreased frequency of i l l i ci t drug use (i n t hi s case cocai ne or m ari j uana) i s associ at ed w i t h hi gher w ages. Thi s resul t , consi st ent across gender and age groups, w as found usi ng a H eckm an t wo-st age est i m at e of a w age equat i on. Li kew i se, G i l l and M i chael s (1992) and Regi st er and W i l l i am s (1992), usi ng t he sam e dat a as K aest ner but sl i ght l y di fferent approaches t o cont rol for t he sel f -sel ect i on of i ndi vi dual s i nt o drug use and t he l abour m arket , fi nd very si m i l ar resul t s. These fi ndi ngs echo t he resul t s t hat have been found for t he rel at i onshi p bet w een al cohol and w ages. (1995) suggest t hat t he rel at i onshi p bet w een drug use and w ages w i l l vary w i t h t he st age of an i ndi vi dual 's career. U si ng a fol l ow-up cohort of t he N LSY , t hey fi nd a posi t i ve rel at i onshi p bet w een drug use and w ages i n t he earl y stages of an i ndi vi dual 's career, but a negat i ve rel at i onshi p l at er on i n t he career (i n t he m i d-t hi rt i es).
H ow ever, Burgess and Proper (1998) , usi ng t he sam e dat a source, are not abl e t o repl i cat e t hi s fi ndi ng. In t hei r anal ysi s t hey consi der t he effect s of earl y l i fe behavi our (such as drug and al cohol consum pt i on) and l at er l i fe out com es, i ncl udi ng product i vi t y. Thei r resul t s suggest t hat adol escent al cohol and soft drug use has l i t t l e or no effect on t he earni ngs of m en i n t hei r l at e t w ent i es or t hi rt i es, al t hough t hey do fi nd t hat earl y hard drug use has a si gni fi cant negat i ve i m pact . A ge di fferences have al so been found by Buchm uel l er and Zuvekas (1998), w ho anal ysed dat a from t he U S N at i onal Inst i t ut e of M ent al H eal t h's Epi dem i ol ogi cal Cat chm ent A rea (ECA ) survey t hat w as col l ect ed i n t he earl y ei ght i es. Buchm uel l er and Zuvekas m ake t he sam e cri t i ci sm of N LSY st udi es as K andel et al . , i n t hat com pared t he N LSY , t he ECA covers pri m e-age (30-45 years ol d) w orkers as w el l as young peopl e. Thei r resul t s suggest t hat w hi l st t here i s evi dence of a posi t i ve rel at i onshi p bet w een drug use and i ncom e for young w orkers, t here i s st rong evi dence t o suggest t hat 'probl em at i c' drug use by pri m e-age w orkers i s associ at ed w i t h l ow er i ncom es.
In concl udi ng t hi s sect i on w e not e t hat apart from M acD onal d and Pudney (2000a, b, c) t here i s l i t t l e w ork i n t hi s area t hat i s set i n a Bri t i sh cont ext . M acD onal d and Pudney (2000a, b) fi nd l i t t l e evi dence t o support t he K andel et al . (1995) l i fe-span hypot hesi s, i ndeed, l i ke Burgess and Propper (1998) Cl earl y t he em pi ri cal evi dence on t he l abour m arket out com es of i l l i ci t drug use i s m i xed, but t here w oul d appear t o be som e evi dence of negat i ve hum an capi t al effect s i n rel at i on t o drug users, and h ence t he l abour m arket effect s of i l l i ci t drug use are a genui ne concern for pol i cy m akers.
The Legislative Debate
So far w e have consi dered t w o areas of t he econom i cs l i t erat ure t hat al l ow us t o furt her underst and i l l i ci t drug use and i t s consequences. In econom i cs, t here i s al so a l i t erat ure t hat focuses on t he consequences of l egal i si ng current l y prohi bi t ed drugs. The m aj ori t y of t hi s l i t erat ure draw s upon t he t heori es out l i ned i n t he previ ous sect i on t o present a case t hat i s t ypi cal l y i n favour of r epeal i ng t he current prohi bi t i on l aw s. A m aj or draw back w i t h m uch of t hi s w ork, how ever, i s t he apparent l ack of det ai l concerni ng t he operat i on of l egal drugs m arket s. W her eas m any com m ent at ors rel y on a di scussi on of t he fai l ures of prohi bi t i on t o argue for l egal i sat i on, very few (perhaps underst andabl y) consi der t he pract i cal i t i es of l egal (regul at ed) drugs m arket s. There are of course som e except i ons, and t hese are t he focus of t hi s bri ef sect i on. Perhaps one of t he m ost vocal of t he prot agoni st s i n t hi s arena i s St evenson (1990, 1991a, b, 1994a, b) . St evenson's argum ent i s qui t e st rai ght forw ard. H e envi sages a free m arket for al l drugs w i t h a bare m i ni m um of regul at i on al ong t he l i nes of t hat for al cohol .
Thi s regul at i on w oul d be used t o safeguard chi l dren, rest ri ct advert i si ng, l i cence ret ai l out l et s, and provi de rest ri ct i ons for t he operat i on of m achi nery. St evenson argues t hat a free m arket w i t h m i ni m um regul at i on w oul d operat e i n a soci al l y accept abl e m anner, bri ngi ng about l ow er pri ces, i ncr eased qual i t y and m uch product di fferent i at i on. These concl usi ons are m ai nl y draw n from observat i ons about t he w orki ngs of t he prohi bi t ed m arket and how l egal i sat i on w i l l rem ove m any of t he negat i ve consequences of enforcem ent . The m ai n i ssues are present ed bel ow ; i n part i cul ar t hose rel at i ng t o t he suppl y si de of a l egal m arket and t he process of adj ust m ent t ow ards m arket equi l i bri um . O f course, one m i ght argue t hat t hi s al ready exi st s i n i l l egal m arket s, as deal ers are unl i kel y t o w ant t o i nt ent i onal l y poi son t hei r cust om ers (c. f. N adel m ann (1988) , w ho cont rast s t he sm al l num ber of narcot i c-rel at ed deat hs w i t h t he huge num bers of deat hs associ at ed w i t h al cohol and t obacco abuse). In rel at i on t o t hi s i ssue, t he l egal sanct i on of t obacco suppl y has cert ai nl y not resul t ed i n a 'saf e' product , al t hough producers have react ed t o dem and by suppl yi ng 'l ow er t ar' ci garet t es. H ow ever, St evenson (1991 es. H ow ever, St evenson ( , 1994a and Cl ark (1992) bot h draw a com pari son w i t h t he al cohol i ndust ry t o concl ude t hat consum ers are m ore l i kel y t o be cert ai n about t he qual i t y of l egal l y suppl i ed drugs t han t hey w oul d be w i t h t hose from an i l l i ci t suppl y (e. g. com pare 'm oonshi ne' w i t h branded w hi sky). Chesher and W odak (1990) The purpose of t hi s bri ef sect i on w as t o hi ghl i ght som e of t he debat e i n t he econom i cs l i t erat ure concerni ng al t ernat i ves t o t he prohi bi t i on of drugs. There i s no em pi ri cal w ork i n 14 Thi s esti m at e i s based on an analysis of seizure data, i nform at i on on consum pti on form t he N at i onal Inst i t ut e of D rug A buse nati onal household survey, and D rug Enforcem ent A gency esti m at es of street pri ces (w i t h data on t obacco producti on and sell i ng cost used as a proxy for cannabis). t hi s area, and t he concl usi ons t hat have been draw n cannot be t est ed under current condi t i ons.
Supply in the Legal Drugs market
In t hi s sense, t he cont ri but i on t o t he debat e on l egal i sat i on represent ed by t hi s w ork i s l i m i t ed, but i t i s based on basi c econom i c pri nci pl es. In t he next sect i on w e consi der t he cont ri but i on of econom i cs t o underst andi ng t he consequences of current drugs pol i cy.
Current Policy Interventions
The use of a w el fare econom i cs fram ew ork t o anal yse t he probl em of drug m i suse oft en resul t s i n a qui t e persuasi ve case agai nst prohi bi t i on, or at l east no com pel l i ng case i n i t s favour. H ow ever, apart from t he D ut ch pol i cy of decri m i nal i sat i on (see de K ort 1994) and t he Sout h A ust ral i an Cannabi s Expi at i on N ot i ce (CEN ) syst em (see Sut t on & Sarre 1992), t here are very few governm ent s w orl d-w i de t hat advocat e anyt hi ng ot her t han out ri ght prohi bi t i on.
If one t akes as gi ven t he pol i cy t hat drug consum pt i on i s t o be reduced (t he t ypi cal publ i c pol i cy), t hen i t i s w i t h respect t o t he opt i m al use of pol i ci es t hat econom i c anal ysi s can be of great val ue. A bri ef revi ew of t he econom i cs of drug enforcem ent pol i ci es i s present ed i n W agst aff and M aynard (1988). The aut hors hi ghl i ght t he debat e bet w een advocat es of suppl ysi de pol i ci es and t hose w ho favour dem and-si de pol i ci es. The t heoret i cal debat e i n t hi s respect i s perhaps hi ndered by a l ack of i nform at i on; how ever, t here are a num ber of recent papers t hat have at t em pt ed t o address t hat probl em . Before consi deri ng t hese furt her i t i s appropri at e t o out l i ne t he opt i ons avai l abl e t o pol i cy m akers w here t he ul t i m at e goal i s t o reduce consum pt i on and t o hi ghl i ght t he debat es t hat have t aken pl ace i n t hi s cont ext .
Supply-Side Enforcement Policies
The cl assi c vi ew of drug consum pt i on i s t hat dem and i s com pl et el y pri ce i nel ast i c w i t h respect t o addi ct i ve goods (Rot t enburg 1968). If t hi s i s t he case t hen t here are num erous i m pl i cat i ons for publ i c pol i cy i nt ended t o t arget t he suppl y si de. Suppl y-si de pol i ci es (such as sei zures, l arge-scal e purchase or dest ruct i on of crops, i ncreased severi t y of penal t i es for deal i ng, et c. ) are i m pl em ent ed i n order t o reduce t he avai l abl e suppl y t o users and push up t he m arket pri ce of a drug so as t o reduce consum pt i on. W het her or not t hi s occurs i n pract i ce i s a m at t er for debat e (see l at er), but i f t hi s t ype of i nt ervent i on affect s pri ces, and dem and t ends t o be pri ce i nel ast i c, t he l i kel y out com e i s t hat suppl y-si de pol i ci es are sel f -defeat i ng.
Si l verm an and Sprui l l (1977) hi ghl i ght t hi s di l em m a qui t e succi nct l y: … I f t he num ber of addi ct s w ho do not adj ust t hei r habi t [i n react i on t o pri ce changes], but com m i t cri m e t o m ai nt ai n i t is large, societ y i s caught in a vi ci ous spiral: M ore cri m e l eads to m ore vigorous suppression of the heroi n suppl y, and t he result i ng ri se i n pri ces aggravates t he cri m e problem furt her.
(Si l verm an and Sprui l l , 1977, p. 81).
In ot her w ords, suppl y-si de pol i ci es t hat push up pri ces i n t he face of i nel ast i c dem and do no m ore t han put m ore m oney i n t he hands of suppl i ers. Such argum ent s have l ed com m ent at ors t o suggest t hat dem and-si de pol i ci es are l i kel y t o be m ore (cost ) effect i ve t han suppl y-side cont rol . Indeed, H ol ahan (1973) had earl i er com m ent ed t hat : … Si nce t he dem and for heroi n i s m ost l i kel y pri ce-i nelasti c, at l east over a w i de range, i t i s probabl y m ore w ort hw hi l e t o operate directl y on dem and by affecti ng such vari ables as t astes, t he pri ces and avail abil i t y of alt ernati ve drugs, t reatm ent avail abil i t y, and so on. Thi s di scussi on hi ghl i ght s t w o key debat es t hat need t o be addressed em pi ri cal l y.
Fi rst l y, i s i t t he case t hat suppl y si de enforcem ent pol i ci es, such as sei zures, push t he pri ce of drugs upw ards? If t hi s i s t he case, t hen do i ncreases i n pri ce reduce t he l evel of consum pt i on of drugs? A nsw ers t o t hese quest i ons are fundam ent al t o our assessm ent of current suppl y si de pol i ci es. In t he fol l ow i ng sect i ons w e consi der how econom i st s have gone about addressi ng t hese i ssues.
The Effect of Supply-Side Enforcement Policies on Price
A s al ready m ent i oned, t he pri m ary ai m of suppl y-side enforcem ent pol i ci es i s t o push up i l l i ci t drug pri ces so t hat t hey becom e prohi bi t i ve. A l t hough t here has been som e t heoret i cal debat e over t he i m pact of enforcem ent pol i ci es on pri ces, t here i s very l i t t l e em pi ri cal w ork i n t hi s area. Tw o not ew ort hy except i ons st and out . D i N ardo (1993) has st udi ed t he effect of cocai ne sei zures on pri ce and, bui l di ng on t hi s w ork, Y uan (1994) has consi dered t he effect of enforcem ent pol i ci es on t he pri ce of heroi n and cocai ne. The m ot i vat i on for t hi s area of research i s dri ven by t he possi bi l i t y t hat al t hough t he t ypi cal enforcem ent pol i cy of sei zure m ay have som e i m pact on pri ce, i t i s qui t e possi bl e t hat vari at i ons i n sei zures are act ual l y dri ven by changes i n quant i t y avai l abl e, w hi ch affect pri ce at t he sam e t i m e. In other w ords t he causal rel at i onshi p bet w een enforcem ent and pri ces i s not necessary obvi ous. W hat i s m ore, as suggest ed by H ol ahan (1973), i t i s open t o debat e as t o w het her even l arge-scal e sei zures can have any effect on pri ce gi ven t he pot ent i al l y l arge num ber of suppl i ers and t he l ucrat i ve profi t s t hat at t ract t hem i nt o t he m arket . D i N ardo (1993) i nvest i gat es t hi s i ssue by consi deri ng dat a avai l abl e from t he U S D rug Enforcem ent A dm i ni st rat i on's (D EA ) Syst em t o Ret ri eve Inform at i on from D rug Evi dence (STRID E) and dat a from t he M oni t ori ng t he Fut ure (M TF) sam pl e of U S hi gh school seni ors.
STRID E i s used t o produce pri ce seri es for cocai ne and sei zure i nform at i on, w hereas t he M TF dat a are used t o provi de i nform at i on on consum pt i on. D i N ardo uses a vari et y of est i m at i on t echni ques and quasi -experi m ent s t o t est w het her vari at i ons (over t i m e or by regi on) i n D EA sei zures of cocai ne can hel p expl ai n vari at i ons i n ei t her dem and or t he pri ce of cocai ne.
Regardl ess of t he t echni que used, D i N ardo fi nds l i t t l e evi dence t o suggest t hat l aw enforcem ent has a st at i st i cal l y si gni fi cant posi t i ve i m pact on t he pri ce of cocai ne. If anyt hi ng, t here appears t o be a negat i ve rel at i onshi p bet w een sei zures and cocai ne pri ces. O n t he ot her hand, D i N ardo fi nds t hat t he rel at i onshi p bet w een sei zures and quant i t y dem anded i s act ual l y posi t i ve (i . e. hi gher sei zures t end t o occur w here t he drug probl em i s great est ). The aut hor suggest s t hat t hi s fi ndi ng i s consi st ent w i t h t he hypot hesi s t hat sei zures are di rect ed w here t he drug probl em i s m ost not i ceabl e and t hus t hey t end t o m i rror dem and. Thus, sei zures w i l l be l ow est w here t he dem and for cocai ne, and hence pri ces, i s l ow est . In ot her w ords, vari at i ons i n pri ce refl ect vari at i ons i n dem and; w hereas enforcem ent and suppl y are endogenousl y det erm i ned.
Y uan's (1994) approach am ount s t o an ext ensi on of D i N ardo's w ork, t aki ng i nt o account t he need t o i dent i fy t he di rect i on of any causal rel at i onshi p bet w een enforcem ent and pri ces. A s w i t h D i N ardo, Y uan uses dat a produced from STRID E and est i m at es a vect or aut oregressi on m odel t o t est t he G ranger -causal i t y bet w een enforcem ent and drug pri ces. The aut hor al so consi ders t he effect of very l arge sei zures by com pari ng pri ces pre and post sei zure. In effect G ranger-causal i t y from enforcem ent t o pri ces w oul d be a correl at i on bet w een pri ces i n t he current peri od and enforcem ent of previ ous peri ods. H ow ever, i t i s qui t e possi bl e t hat any G ranger -causal i t y observed t hrough aut oregressi on t est s i s act ual l y dri ven by a t hi rd unm easured vari abl e t hat rel at es t o t he t w o vari abl es under i nvest i gat i on. A s such, Y uan suggest s t hat fi ndi ng no G ranger -causal i t y i s a m ore robust resul t t han fi ndi ng G rangercausal i t y. U si ng t i m e seri es dat a for 135 m ont hs, Y uan fi rm l y rej ect s t he nul l hypot hesi s t hat changes i n enf orcem ent do not G ranger -cause changes i n pri ces (al t hough t hi s i s onl y si gni fi cant w hen sei zures are m easured i n num ber, not w ei ght or val ue). In ot her w ords, Y uan does fi nd a l i nk bet w een enforcem ent and pri ces, but hi s resul t s suggest t hat t he rel at i onshi p i s negat i ve. In addi t i on t o t hi s, Y uan al so fi nds t hat changes i n cocai ne pri ces respond negat i vel y t o changes i n heroi n sei zures, and changes i n heroi n pri ces respond negat i vel y t o changes i n cocai ne sei zures. Y uan confi rm s t hese resul t s from an anal ysi s of very l arge cocai ne and heroi n sei zures and pri ce vari at i ons before and aft er t he sei zures. The i m pl i cat i ons ari si ng from t he w ork of Y uan and D i N ardo are m i xed and requi re furt her research. These resul t s coul d be reveal i ng m ore about w hat i s happeni ng on t he dem and-si de t han t he suppl y-side, w hereby dem and i s bei ng reduced (as a resul t of t he i ncrease i n percei ved ri sk fol l ow i ng observed sei zures) 15 m ore t han suppl y i s bei ng reduced and hence pri ce i s fal l i ng.
The Effect of Price Changes on Consumption
W e have al ready seen t hat t here i s som e debat e over w het her enforcem ent act ual l y has any effect on pri ces. H ow ever, assum i ng t hat hi gher pri ces are st i l l a pol i cy goal , i t i s cl earl y essent i al t o underst and how pri ces affect consum er behavi our. Indeed, not onl y are pri ce el ast i ci t i es of dem and i m port ant for eval uat i ng enforcem ent pol i ci es, such i nform at i on i s rel evant for assessi ng t he i m pact of al t ernat i ve pol i ci es t o prohi bi t i on (Lee, 1993) . The specul at i on about t he ow n pri ce el ast i ci t y of dem and for drugs hi ghl i ght ed earl i er i s not w el l ent renched i n em pi ri cal research. W hereas t here has been consi derabl e research i nt o t he dem and el ast i ci t i es of al cohol and t obacco (as di scussed earl i er i n sect i on 2), research i n t he area of i l l i ci t drugs i s som ew hat pat chy. O f course t he m ai n obst acl e t o progress i n t hi s area i s t he l ack of avai l abl e dat a. There are how ever som e not abl e except i ons t o t he general l ack of act i vi t y i n t hi s i m port ant research area. Before w e consi der t hese, w e shoul d fi rst di scuss t he t heoret i cal debat e about pri ce responsi veness of drug users.
There has been consi derabl e debat e as t o w het her dem and behavi our i n i l l i ci t drug m arket s i s part i cul arl y pri ce i nel ast i c. M oore (1973, 1990) suggest s t hat i t i s t he 'effect i ve pri ce' t hat i s of rel evance t o drug users not t he m arket pri ce and t hat any reduct i on i n consum pt i on fol l ow i ng a pri ce ri se i s suffi ci ent t o j ust i fy suppl y-si de pol i ci es. Thi s effect i ve pri ce m i ght be defi ned by an i ndex i ncl udi ng t he m arket pri ce, t he puri t y of t he drug, ri sk of t he m arket , et c. A s such, di fferent users w i l l react i n di fferent w ays accordi ng t o t he know l edge t hey have t o det erm i ne an effect i ve pri ce. Thi s m i ght w el l be t rue for, say, experi m ent al users, w ho w oul d have w eak know l edge of t he m arket and subsequent l y be som ew hat pri ce responsi ve. Becker et al . (1991) ext end t he t heoret i cal debat e about t he possi bi l i t y of di fferent pri ce responses for di fferent users by recourse t o t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel di scussed earl i er. Thei r argum ent i s t hat t he young and poor are m ore l i kel y t o react t o m oney pri ce changes because t ypi cal l y t hey pl ace a sm al l er m onet ary val ue on 15 A l t hough t his could be a poli cy aim i n i t self.
heal t h and ot her fut ure harm ful effect s, w hi ch i n t heory shoul d form part of t he t ot al cost of an addi ct i ve good. Therefore, as pri ce becom es a bi gger share of t ot al cost (as i n t he case of younger or poorer users), l ong-run changes i n dem and brought about by changes i n pri ce becom e l arger rel at i ve t o changes t hat m i ght be brought about by changes i n t ot al fut ure cost .
In ot her w ords, l ow er i ncom e peopl e (or younger peopl e) t end t o respond m ore t o changes i n pri ce t han do hi gher i ncom e peopl e (or ol der peopl e), w ho t end t o react m ore t o changes i n fut ure harm ful effect s. for publ i c pol i cy, dependi ng on t he l ocat i on of m arket equi l i bri um . U nfort unat el y t here i s l i t t l e or no evi dence t o support such a hypot hesi s, al t hough t here have been som e at t em pt s t o est i m at e t he pri ce el ast i ci t y of dem and for som e drugs w hi ch w e w i l l now consi der.
O ne of t he earl i est at t em pt s at 'm easuri ng' t he pri ce el ast i ci t y of dem and for a drug i s present ed i n Si l verm an and Sprui l l (1977). The focus of t hi s research i s an i nvest i gat i on i nt o t he rel at i onshi p bet w een a pri ce i ndex for ret ai l heroi n and m ont hl y-recorded cri m es, t he assum pt i on bei ng t hat heroi n expendi t ure i s a funct i on of t he ret ai l pri ce and quant i t y consum ed. Thi s rel at i onshi p bet w een expendi t ure and consum pt i on can be si m pl y expressed as:
w here,P t i s t he pri ce of heroi n and H (P t ) i s t he quant i t y consum ed at t hi s pri ce. In t hi s case, heroi n consum pt i on i s assum ed t he fol l ow i ng funct i on form : ) and a pot ency of 2. 5% , t he l ong-run el ast i ci t y of consum pt i on i s -0. 267 (reduci ng t o -0. 247 for 10% pot ency). Thi s suggest s t hat a 10% pri ce i ncrease i n ret ai l heroi n w i l l resul t i n onl y a 2. 7% reduct i on i n consum pt i on.
A l t hough t he Si l verm an and Sprui l l resul t s can onl y be vi ew ed as t ent at i ve, t hei r w ork st ood al one i n t he l i t erat ure unt i l t he subj ect w as revi si t ed by Caul ki ns (1995b), Bret t evi l l e-Jensen and Sut t on (1996) , and G rossm an and Chal oupka (1998). The approach t aken by Caul ki ns i s t o ci rcum vent t he l ack of rel i abl e dat a on quant i t y and pri ce by part i t i oni ng t he pri ce el ast i ci t y i nt o t he product of t w o el ast i ci t i es t hat i nvol ve an i nt erm edi at e quant i t y w hose rel at i onshi p w i t h m arket quant i t y can be m odel l ed. U si ng dat a from t he U S D rug U se Forecast i ng Syst em , 16 Caul ki ns i ncl udes t he percent age of arrest ees t est i ng posi t i ve for t he drug i n quest i on as an i nt erm edi at e vari abl e. The m odel breaks t he probl em i nt o a seri es of si m pl er est i m at i on probl em s t hat i ncl udes t he arrest s of drug users and non-users (bot h unrel at ed t o drug use and as a funct i on of drug use) and a funct i on of spendi ng on drugs.
U si ng dat a from t he STRID E t o produce pri ce seri es, Caul ki ns com bi nes t hi s w i t h t he arrest dat a from t he D rug U se Forecast i ng Syst em t o produce a num ber of pri ce el ast i ci t y est i m at es vi a t w o st age l east squares regressi on. In part i cul ar, he est i m at es t he el ast i ci t y of dem and for cocai ne t o be -2. 5 and t hat for heroi n t o be -1. 5. A l t hough t hese are i n sharp cont rast t o t he resul t s for Si l verm an and Sprui l l (1977), t he error bands around t he poi nt est i m at es are qui t e l arge due t o t he m any dat a uncert ai nt i es and, concei vabl y, t he est i m at e for cocai ne coul d be as sm al l as -0. 5.
The em pi ri cal debat e over t he t rue nat ure of dem and el ast i ci t i es i s furt her m uddl ed by t he w ork of Bret t evi l l e-Jensen and Sut t on (1996) w ho i nt roduce a new di st i nct i on bet w een 'ordi nary' drug users and deal er-users. The aut hors use dat a on 500 i ndi vi dual s col l ect ed vi a quest i onnai re from at t endant s at a needl e exchange servi ce i n O sl o, N orw ay. The dat a i ncl udes i nform at i on concerni ng i ncom e (and i t s sources), heroi n consum pt i on, deal i ng act i vi t y (recogni si ng t hat drug users w i l l oft en sw i t ch t o deal i ng t o fi nance t hei r consum pt i on) and pri ces pai d. In addi t i on t o t hi s i nform at i on, t he aut hors al so i ncl ude dat a regardi ng at t i t udes t ow ard ri sk, t he effect of arrest on st at us and i nform at i on on exchange vi si t s and syri nge di st ri but i on. U si ng t hi s dat a Bret t evi l l e-Jensen and Sut t on est i m at e t hree m odel s i n t urn. The fi rst i s a sw i t chi ng regressi on m odel of heroi n consum pt i on w i t h endogenous sw i t chi ng on deal i ng st at us. O bservi ng t hat t he consum pt i on of deal ers and non-deal ers coul d be deri ved from a t w o-equat i on l at ent st ruct ure, t he aut hors j oi nt l y est i m at e t hese w i t h an auxi l i ary equat i on t hat al l ow s for sel f -sel ect i on of deal i ng st at us. The second m odel i s a sel fsel ect i on m odel of t he quant i t y of heroi n sol d by deal ers, j oi nt l y est i m at ed w i t h t he part i ci pat i on equat i on from t he fi rst m odel . Fi nal l y, spl i ne funct i ons are i nt roduced i nt o t he sw i t chi ng regressi on m odel t o t est for di fferent form s of t he rel at i onshi p bet w een pri ce and consum pt i on. Bret t evi l l e-Jensen and Sut t on fi nd t hat t he pri ce el ast i ci t y of dem and for deal ers i s m uch sm al l er (i n m agni t ude) t han t hat of non-deal ers (-0. 20 com pared t o -1. 23). The caveat O t her est i m at es w ort hy of consi derat i on are N i sbet and V aki l (1972) and van O urs (1995) . N i sbet and V aki l (1972) consi der t he pri ce el ast i ci t y of dem and for m ari j uana (cannabi s) usi ng dat a col l ect ed vi a an anonym ous post al quest i onnai re of st udent s. A l t hough t he m et hodol ogy i s pot ent i al l y obj ect i onabl e, t he researchers asked t he st udent s t o t race t hei r ow n dem and funct i ons and t hi s i nform at i on, coupl ed w i t h ot her act ual dat a, w ere used t o est i m at e a l i near and a doubl e l og dem and funct i on. U si ng si m pl e regressi on t echni ques, t he aut hors suggest pri ce el ast i ci t i es of dem and for cannabi s at t he goi ng m arket s pri ces of bet w een -0. 36 t o -1. 51. There are of course m any caveat s t o t hese resul t s, not l east t he nat ure of dat a col l ect i on, but t hey are useful i ndi cat ors of pri ce sensi t i vi t y of cannabi s dem and. A qui t e di fferent approach i s present ed i n V an O urs (1995), w ho t akes a ret rospect i ve l ook at O pi um dem and i n t he Dut ch East Indi es (Indonesi a) for t he peri od 1923 t o 1938. The dat a w ere col l ect ed duri ng t he so-cal l ed O pi um regi e, a syst em by w hi ch t he i m port at i on, product i on and sal e of opi at es w as operat ed vi a a st at e m onopol y. The D ut ch governm ent i nt ended t o use t he syst em t o reduce cri m i nal i t y, guarant ee puri t y and ul t i m at el y reduce opi um use. To est i m at e pri ce el ast i ci t i es, van O urs used consum pt i on dat a from 22 regi ons for t he peri od under consi derat i on and const ruct ed seri es for t he real opi um pri ce and real i ncom e. U si ng t w o st age l east squares, t he el ast i ci t y of dem and for opi um i n t he peri od i s est i m at ed at -0. 7 and -1. 0 for t he short and l ong-run respect i vel y.
Cl earl y t here i s not yet a consensus on t he possi bl e range of pri ce el ast i ci t i es for cert ai n drugs.The vari ous em pi ri cal est i m at es found i n t he l i t erat ure are sum m ari sed i n Tabl e 1.
A l t hough t hese fi gures i l l ust rat e t he w i de range of est i m at es t hat have been present ed, t he general concl usi on m ust be t hat for m any drugs consum er dem and i s t o som e ext ent responsi ve t o changes i n m arket pri ce and t herefore pol i cy i nt ervent i ons need t o be devi sed w i t h t hi s i n m i nd. Indeed, t hese resul t s suggest t hat i l l i ci t drug users are on average j ust as, or even m ore responsi ve t o pri ce changes t han ci garet t e sm okers, al t hough one m ust bear i n m i nd t he error bands on al l t hese est i m at es (see Labeaga (1999) for a di scussi on of recent est i m at es of t he pri ce el ast i ci t y of dem and for ci garet t es).
Tabl e 1. Sum m ary of pri ce el ast i ci t y est i m at es for vari ous drugs 
Demand-Side Policies
In t he previ ous sect i on w e consi dered how pol i ci es ai m ed at affect i ng drug suppl y m i ght be eval uat ed. W e now t urn our at t ent i on t o t he pol i ci es ai m ed at changi ng consum er dem and for drugs. There t ends not t o be a great deal of di scussi on i n t he econom i cs l i t erat ure about t he effi cacy or desi rabi l i t y of so-cal l ed dem and-si de pol i ci es. Thi s i s perhaps underst andabl e, as t he t ypi cal ai m of t hese pol i ci es i s t o reduce t he consum pt i on of i l l i ci t drugs t hrough educat i on, rehabi l i t at i on or harm reduct i on program m es, w hereas econom i st s have been concerned w i t h t he m ore general consequences of addi ct i ve behavi our (Buck et al . 1996) . W e have al ready seen t hat drug users are l i kel y t o respond t o pri ce changes, part i cul arl y i n t he l ong run and t hat pol i ci es t hat bri ng about l ong-t erm changes i n drugs pri ces w i l l have a m ore l ast i ng affect t han t em porary 'w ars on drugs'. H ow ever, w e al so need t o consi der pol i ci es t hat are ai m ed at addi ct s di rect l y. In t hi s respect , w e can refl ect on t w o opposi ng out com es i n t he l i t erat ure: one t hat com es from t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on fram ew ork and one t hat i s based on em pi ri cal evi dence, al bei t at a l ocal l evel .
W hen anal ysed i n t he cont ext of t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel , harm reduct i on program m es have been cri t i ci sed for bei ng count er product i ve (N eri and H eat her, 1995;
St evenson, 1994a). The reason for t hi s concl usi on i s t hat harm-reduct i on i ni t i at i ves, such as needl e exchanges and i nform at i on cent res, effect i vel y reduce t he expect ed cost of addi ct i on.
Thi s i s because rat i onal addi ct s w i l l t ake account of t he t ot al cost of drugs, w hi ch i ncl udes t he ext ra cost and ri sk (or fut ure harm ) associ at ed w i t h i l l egal act i vi t y (e. 
Concluding Remarks
W e began t hi s revi ew by consi deri ng t he cont ri but i on of t he econom i c m odel of Rat i onal A ddi ct i on t o t he st udy of addi ct i ve behavi our. Becker and M urphy's (1988) t heory i s an i m port ant st art i ng poi nt i n t he econom i cs l i t erat ure as t he aut hors show t hat addi ct i ve, and t ypi cal l y harm ful , behavi our i s qui t e rat i onal i n t he sense t hat i t i nvol ves forw ard-l ooki ng ut i l i t y m axi m i sat i on w i t h st abl e preferences. A l t hough t hi s m i ght appear at odds w i t h w hat w e know about addi ct i ve behavi our, t he m odel appears t o adequat el y descri be pat t erns of drug use t hat have been observed. Em pi ri cal l y, t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel has been appl i ed i n a num ber of cont ext s. In t he m aj ori t y of cases, t he propert i es of t he m odel appear t o hol d t rue, w i t h t he coeffi ci ent s on past and fut ure consum pt i on found t o be st at i st i cal l y si gni fi cant and posi t i ve, and t he coeffi ci ent on current pri ce negat i ve and si gni fi cant .
Beyond t he Rat i onal A ddi ct i on m odel , w e consi dered t he w el fare econom i cs fram ew ork and saw how i t i s a val uabl e t ool for i dent i fyi ng t he rel evant soci al cost s of i l l i ci t drug use. It i s perhaps best t hought of as a fram ew ork for t hought , and cl earl y i t provi des a rat i onal e for governm ent i nt ervent i on. For exam pl e, t he fram ew ork suggest t hat t here are a num ber of ext ernal cost s of drug use, such as cri m e and heal t h care cost s, t hat are not t aken i nt o account by t he i ndi vi dual w hen m aki ng hi s or her deci si on t o consum e drugs. Thus by i nt erveni ng i n t he drugs m arket and bri ngi ng about a decrease i n consum pt i on, t he subsequent reduct i on i n soci et y's cost s exceed t he reduct i on i n i ndi vi dual s' benefi t s and overal l w el fare i s i m proved.
O ne of t he di ffi cul t i es w i t h t hi s approach t o pol i cy recom m endat i ons, how ever, i s t hat i t i s a norm at i ve fram ew ork t hat accept s i dea of consum er soverei gnt y. Thi s m akes i t i ncom pat i bl e w i t h t he rat i onal e for i nt ervent i on t hat com es from t he i dea of 'dem eri t goods', w hereby i ndi vi dual s are t hought not t o act i n t hei r ow n best i nt erests w hen t hey m ake t he deci si on t o consum e pot ent i al l y harm ful drugs.
Fi nal l y i n t hi s revi ew w e have seen t hat econom i st s have at t em pt ed t o furt her our underst andi ng of t he rel at i onshi p bet w een enforcem ent pol i ci es, pri ces, and consum er behavi our. Thi s w ork represent s a fundam ent al cont ri but i on t o furt heri ng our underst andi ng of i l l i ci t drug use. H ow ever, echoi ng t he concern of Bri dges (1999), quot ed i n t he i nt roduct i on t o t hi s paper, pol i cy m akers and drug researchers do not appear t o have ful l y recogni sed t hi s i n t hei r w ork. Thi s concern w as refl ect ed i n a recent edi t ori al of t he j ournal Addi ct i on:
… It i s not only bett er price data, but also bett er analysis t hat are needed. Pri ces can only be understood in the context of m arket dynam ics. Too often the t erm "dem and" is used w hen consum pt i on i s m ore appropri ate, and suppl y i s equat ed (2000a)).
